Palestine as a unitary republic with equal rights for all

The Peel Commission Report, 1937, Chapter II "The War and the Mandate". page 16
1. The Arab Revolt.

1. For many years before the War the Arab Provinces of the Turkish Empire had been restive under the rule of the Sultan at Constantinople, and the Turkish Army had often been engaged in repressing the outbreaks of the free-spirited tribes-men in the Arabian Peninsula. No less dangerous to Ottoman ascendancy was the growth of a nationalist movement among the young intelligenzia of Syria. Its origin may be traced to the awakening, about 1860, of a new interest in Arab history and culture. Societies were established for the study of the Arab golden age and the revival of Arabic literature.

The movement gained impetus from the foundation in 1866 under American auspices of the Syrian Protestant College, soon to be famous throughout the Near East as Roberts College. It did admirable work in acquainting the youth of Syria with the ideas of the Western world; but among them were the ideas of self-government and nationality; and nationalism was as inevitably stimulated by American education in Syria as it was by British education in India.

For a generation and more the cause made little headway under the despotic rule of Abdul Hamid, but the coup d’état of the Young Turks in 1908 seemed for a moment to have opened a new age of freedom throughout the Empire. A constitution was wrested from the Sultan, based on the representation of all the provinces. In the first Parliament, however, the Syrian Arabs were greatly under-represented in the Lower House and they only had three out of forty seats in the Upper House; and it was soon plain that the hopes of autonomous Arab provinces, free to develop Arab life and culture to the full, were to be disappointed.

The efficient Committee of Union and ProgressPeelCUP stood for centralization, not local ”home-rule“, for ”Turcification” rather than an Arab renaissance. Arab nationalism was thus driven under-ground. From 1909 onwards secret societies were founded in Paris, Constantinople, Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut: an Arab Congress was held in Paris in 1913; and the idea gained currency of a general Arab rising, if a favourable opportunity should occur, and the creation of a free and united Arab State with its capital at Damascus. The Turkish Government was not without all knowledge of this seditious propaganda and did what it could to suppress it. The trial of Aziz Ali in 1914 excited considerable attention in Western Europe.

2. Such was the position when on the 31st October, 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered the War.

Two dangers were at once apparent to the Allied Powers. Syria and Palestine might be made the base for a Turco-German attack on the Suez Canal; and the prestige of the Caliphate might be used in an attempt to raise all Islam against the Allies in a Jihad or Holy War. To meet the first danger troops were concentrated in Egypt. To meet the second, negotiations were opened with Hussein, Sherif and Emir of Mecca and hereditary guardian of the Moslem Holy Places of Mecca and Medina. Hussein and his people had long cherished similar ideas of throwing off the Turkish yoke to those of the Syrian nationalists, and it was intimated to him that his participation in the War on the Allies’ side might lead to that result. When the Sultan-Caliph proclaimed the Jihad at Constantinople in November, Hussein refused to allow it to be preached in the mosques of the Holy Cities. But he took no further action, and the next move came from the British side. In June, 1915, British policy as to the future of Arabia Proper was made clear by the issue of a proclamation in Egypt, the the Sudan, and Arabia, announcing that at the conclusion of peace the independence of the Arabian Peninsula would be assured.

3. But there were other Arab provinces in the Turkish Empire and other than British interests involved in its possible dis­ruption. In March, 1915, the French Government explained that in that event France would claim control of Syria, including (as the term had long included) Palestine. This proposition was discussed by a [British] governmental committee which reported in June, 1915, that the French claim to northern Syria should be conceded but that, owing to the world-wide importance of the Holy Land, Jerusalem and part of Palestine should be reserved for international administration.

4. Meanwhile the fortunes of the Allies in this field of the War had prospered. In February, 1915, the Turco-German attack on the Suez Canal was decisively repulsed. In April the Allied occupation of Gallipoli began; and so hopeful seemed its propects for the first few months that by July rumours of the approaching fall of Constantinople were spreading through the East.

Arab opinion reacted quickly. In the first place the secret Nationalist Committee in Syria decided to reject the promises of independence offered them by the Turkish and German Governments and to make common cause with the Sherif of Mecca.PeelDamascusP

Secondly, in a letter dated the 14th July, 1915, Hussein informed Sir Henry McMahon, then [British] High Commissioner in Egypt, as to the terms on which he was prepared to co-operate with Great Britain against the Turks. The essential passage of the letter was as follows: -

”England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to 37° of latitude, on which degree falls Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Amadia Island (Jezireh), up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south, by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west, by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina.”

This claim, of course, went far beyond the already promised independence of the Arabian Peninsula. It embraced almost the whole Arab world in Asia. It was clearly inspired to no slight extent by the ideas of Syrian nationalism. Sir Henry McMahon, in a friendly and encouraging reply, declared that the discussion of boundaries was premature.

5. A few weeks earlier the Allied cause had received a serious set-back. On 10th August the British attack on Sari Bair from Suvla Bay[FN Gallipoli] broke down. The fall of Constantinople seemed indefinitely postponed. The risks to which the Arabs would be exposed if they openly revolted were obviously increased. There was consequently a change of tone in the Sherif’s second letter to Sir Henry McMahon, written on the 9th September.

”Your Excellency will pardon me and permit me to say clearly that the coolness and hesitation displayed in the question of the limits and boundaries ... might be taken to infer an estrangement or something of that sort.”

About the same time as Sir Henry McMahon received this letter he was also informed of conversations which had been carried on with a representative of the Syrian Nationalist Committee, who made it clear that the Arabs’ choice between the Central Powers and the Allies would be determined by the nature of British assurances as to their future independence. He asserted that, while the Arabs wanted all the Arab countries to be free, they admitted the existence of British interests in ‘Iraq and French interests on the Syrian coast. They would insist, however, on the independence of the Syrian interior — the districts of Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. Sir Henry McMahon communicated this information, together with the Sherif’s letters to Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office, and he was authorized to reply to the Sherif on the lines he [Sir Henry McMahon] had himself suggested. On the 24th October, accordingly, he wrote the following letter to the Sherif :-

”I have received your letter [of 9th September] with much pleasure; and your expressions of sincerity and friendliness have given me the greatest satisfaction.

“ I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but it appear[ed to] me the moment had not arrived when they could be profitably discussed.

“ I have realized, however, from your last letter, that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have therefore lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter; and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement which, I am confident, you will receive with satisfaction :-

” The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should, be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs we accept these limits and boundaries, and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of our ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:-

” Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca. Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability.

“ When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.

” On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European Advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

” With regard to the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognize that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local population and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

“ I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubts of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her traditional friends, the Arabs, and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which, for so many years, has pressed heveily upon them...

Of the passages we have italicized, the second is significant in relation to the claim which had been made by the French Government in March, 1915 to the ultimate control of all Syria including Palestine. But it is the first passage on which the subsequent controversy has centered.

6. The map inserted at this page shows that under Turkish rule the territory under discussion was divided into three administrative areas, the Vialyets of Aleppo, Syria, and Beirut. The Vilayet of Syria extended southwards to include the area now called Trans-Jordan. The Vilayet of Beirut extended southwards to within a short distance of Jaffa. The rest of Palestine, including Jerusalem, was not included in any of the Vilayets: it was an "independent Sanjak".PeelSancak

7. The Arab case, which was fully stated in the evidence submitted to us by the Arab Higher Committee, has always been that Palestine was included in the area in which Sir Henry McMahon promised that Arab independence would be recognized. The two main points are (1) that, since the part of the Western boundary of the independent area proposed by the Sherif was the Mediterranean, the exclusion of the whole of the Mediterranean coast from that area could not have been intended and (2) that Damascus was the most southerly point mentioned and that Palestine could not be regarded as lying to the west of it.

8. We have not considered that our terms of reference required us to undertake the detailed and lengthy research among the documents of 20 years ago which would be needed for a full re-examination of this issue. We think it sufficient for the purposes of this Report to state that the British Government have never accepted the Arab case. When it was first formally presented by the Arab Delegation in London in 1922, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Churchill) replied as follows : -

” That letter [Sir H. McMahon’s letter of the 24th October, 1915] is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among, other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of Damascus.PeelChurchill

This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty’s Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H. McMahon’s pledge.”

9. It was in the highest degree unfortunate that, in the exigencies of war, the British Government was unable to make their intention clear to the Sherif.PeelSherif

Palestine, it will have been noticed, was not expressly mentioned in Sir Henry McMahon’s letter of the 24th October, 1915. Nor was any later reference made to it. In the further correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif the only areas relevant to the present discussion which were mentioned were the Vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut. The Sherif asserted that these Vilayets were pure1y Arab; and, when Sir Henry McMahon pointed out that French interests were involved, he replied that, while he did not recede from his full claims in the north, he did not wish to injure the alliance between Britain and France and would not ask “for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts” till after the War. There was no more bargaining over boundaries. It only remained for the British Government to supply the Sherif with the monthly subsidy in gold and the rifles, ammunition and foodstuffs he required for launching and sustaining the revolt.

10. Meantime the French interest in Syria had been re affirmed. In November, 1915, shortly after Sir Henry McMahon had given his ”pledge” to the Sherif, Sir Edward Grey gave instructions that negotiations should be opened in London with M. Georges Picot, representing the French Government, with a view to reconciling British, French and Arab claims in tht Syrian area. M. Picot insisted at the outset that the whole Syria down the the Egyptian frontier must be assigned to France. After consultation with his Government he agreed to the Syrian interior being administered by Arabs under French influence. Further negotiations were carried on by M. Picot and Sir Mark Sykes, who consulted the Russian Government. Finally, in May, 1916, an agreement was concluded, commonly known as the Sykes-Pioot Agreement, which divided the Arab area north of the Arabian Peninsula in the following manner :-

(1) A coastal belt from a little north of Haifa to a little West of Mersina was to be controlled by France.

(2) Southern 'Iraq, from the Persion Gulf to a little north of Baghdad, together with a small enclave around Haifa, was to be controlled by Britain.

(3) "With a view to securing the religious interests of the Entente Powers, Palestine, with the Holy Places, is to be separated from Turkish territory and subjected to a special regime to be determined by agreement between Russia, France and Great Britain."

(4) The rest of the territory under discussion was left to ”the Arab State or Confederation of States“. In the Syrian interior such advice and administrative assistance as were wanted by the Arabs would be supplied by France, in northern ‘Iraq and the country east of the Jordan by Britain.

11. This agreement was kept secret till in November, 1917, the Russian Bolshevik Government published a copy of it, found in the archives of the Foreign Office at Petrograd. It was thus in ignorance of any other compact than the "McMahon Pledge" that in June, 1916, the Sherif declared war against the Turks. The story of the Arab Revolt is too familiar from the fame and writings of T. E. Lawrence to need re-telling. Its main features may be summarized as follows. By the end of 1916 the Arabs of the Hedjaz had easily overcome the isolated Turkish posts in the south of their country, but they were unable to dislodge the garrison at Medina, which was linked by the Hedjaz railway with the main Turkish forces in the North.

During 19I7 the Turkish posts along the line were continually raided and stretches of the railway repeatedly destroyed.

When the British army invaded Palestine in the autumn of 1917, the Arabs, a few thousand of whom had been trained as a regular force, operated beyond the Jordan on the outer flank of the advance.

Their co-operation was unquestionably a factor in the success of the campaign which culminated in the capture of Jerusalem on the 9th December, 1917, and in the final expulsion of the Turkish forces from Palestine in the following autumn.

The open revolt of the Sherif, moreover, had a marked effect on the wavering sympathies of other Arab tribes than those of the Hedjaz.

12. It was the Sherif’s own people, however, who bore the brunt of the actual fighting. The Arabs of Palestine did not rise against the Turks, and, while some Palestinian conscripts deserted, others continued fighting in the Turkish army. But it must be remembered that to revolt in the desert was far easier than to revolt in a country still in Turkish hands and subject as the British invasion proceeded to increasingly rigorous treatment. As it was, the Turks were seriously embarrassed by their inability to count on the loyalty of the population; and within their lines the Syrian nationalists were engaged in active sedition for which some of them paid the price on the gallows.